Stanley Fieeiki v. West Valley City : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Stanley Fieeiki v. West Valley City : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Richard Catten; West Valley City Attorney; Attorney for West Valley City.
Elizabeth Hunt; Elizabeth Hunt LLC; Attorney for Mr. Fieeiki.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, West Valley City v. Fieeiki, No. 20050459 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5805
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY FIEEIKI, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
Case No. 20050459-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
the Honorable Terry Christiansen, District Judge 
Elizabeth Hunt (#5292) 
569 Browning Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
(801) 461-4300 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
J. Richard Catten (#4291) 
Carol S. Dain (#10065) 
3600 S. Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801) 963-3271 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
FILED 
TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii - iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1-3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 3-4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4-10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 10-11 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 11-20 
CONCLUSION 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 
l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Blackledgev. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) 12 
In Re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1983) 2 
Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, Tfl9; 124 P.3d 269, 274 (Utah 
Ct.App.2005) 2 
People v. Jones, 734 N.E.2d 207, 213 (III.App.3.d2000) 17 
People v. Taylor, 682 N.E.2d 310,313-14 (III App.Ct.1997) 14 
People v. Victory, 419 N.E.2d 73, 76 (III.App.Ct.1981) 13, 14 
Santobello v. New York 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) 12 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992) 3 
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 at U 10 n. 1, 994 P.2d (Utah 2000) 3 
State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d581, 583 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 1 
State v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 817 (lstCir. 1990) 13,14,17 
State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980) 19 
United States v. Fronk, 173 F.R.D. 59, 67 (W.D.N.Y.1997) 13 
United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) 1, 13, 19 
United States v. Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8thCir.l994) 14 
United States v. O'Brien, 618F.2d 1234, 1240-41 (7th Cir.1980) 13 
United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) 13,14, 16, 18 
ii 
United States v. Sema, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.1986) 1, 18 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S., 364, 395 (1948) 1 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985) 1 
STATUTES Page 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
RULES Page 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 30 4, 19 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 408 3, 10, 12 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 410 3, 10, 11, 12, 19,20 
i i i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN CORRECTLY 
FOUND THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT FIEEIKI 
WERE MADE DURING AN ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND 
WERE NOT MADE AS A PART OF A PLEA NEGOTIATION. 
Standard of review: Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935 (Utah 1994) (Reversed on other 
grounds). The district court's determination of whether parties were engaged in plea 
discussions is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 
1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Hudgens, 798 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 
1986)) and, US. v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1986) (whether a party is engaged in plea 
discussion is a factual question that must be determined on a case-by-case basis). 
"Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. For a 
reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial 
court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination." Pena at 935-6, and see Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250,252 (Utah 1985); see also United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395 (1948). "This standard is highly deferential to the trial 
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court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is 
adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be in the best position to assess 
the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an 
appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record/' Id. at 93 6, citing In Re J. 
Children, 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1983). Additionally, 
"[i]n order to challenge a district court's finding of fact, "an appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."" Orlob v. Wasatch 
Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, [^19; 124 P.3d 269, 274 (Utah 
Ct.App.2005). 
"Marshaling the evidence is not simply re-arguing the case, or reviewing the 
evidence at trial...Instead, the parties must "provide a precisely focused 
summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they challenge"...and 
[t]he parties must then convince the appellate court that the district court erred 
in its assessment of that evidence." 
Id. Further, 
"If the appellant contends.. .that the district court has no evidence to support its 
factual finding, then the appellee must present only a "scintilla" of evidence 
that would support the finding the district court made in order to show that the 
appellant did not meet his burden of marshaling the evidence. However, if 
absolutely no evidence exists in the record to support a district court's finding, 
that finding is clearly erroneous." 
ISSUE IL THE GUILTY VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
THE ADMISSION OF FIEEIKIS STATEMENT CONSTITUTES HARMLESS 
ERROR 
Standard of Review: An error is harmless when it is 'sufficiently inconsequential 
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that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings.' " State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 at % 10 n. 1, 994 P.2d (Utah 2000) 
(additional quotations and citation omitted) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 408- COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO 
COMPROMISE 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise 
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability 
for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or 
prosecution. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 410. INADMISSIBILITY OF PLEAS, PLEA 
DISCUSSIONS, AND RELATED STATEMENTS 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or 
criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant 
in the plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; 
or 
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(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later 
withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement 
made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the 
statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal 
proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under 
oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 3(L ERRORS AND DEFECTS 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after 
such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West Valley City accepts defendant Fieeiki's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 4,2003, West Valley City Police officers were dispatched to the address of 
2945 South 6070 West on a "911 hang up." Officers J. Dietrich and C. Dowland responded 
to that location at approximately 11:45 p.m. (R. 325: 89). Upon officers arrival they met a 
female at the door who appeared to be crying, looking towards the ground and soft-spoken. 
(R. 325: 90). This woman, wearing what appeared to be a towel around her head, was then 
identified as Fusina Fieeiki ("Fusina") who stated she had called police. (R. 325: 90-91). 
The officers were invited inside and observed a male, later identified as Stanley Fieeiki 
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("Fieeiki") at the top of the stairs. (R. 325: 91). The officers separated the parties. (R. 325: 
92). The officers also learned the parties are married. (R. 325: 166). 
Fusina was observed by officer Dietrich to have "a mark on her left face, up by her 
left eye area, kind of purplish in color, also swelling in that area... also... a mark on the left 
side of her neck area that was kind of purplish." (R. 325:92). Officer Dietrich noted Fusina 
appeared to be walking slowly and carefully and with no sudden movements. (R. 325: 92). 
The visible injuries were photographed for evidence. (R. 325: 92-93). During the interview 
of Fusina she complained of pain in her back. (R. 325:94). Officer Dowland also observed 
similar injuries as those above on Fusina's head and neck. (R. 325: 114). Fusina advised 
officer Dietrich she would seek medical treatment for her injuries the following day and was 
seen holding an ice pack over her left eye. (R. 325: 101). 
Officer Dowland had the initial contact with Fieeiki in the upstairs of the residence. 
(R: 325: 112). Fieeiki immediately advised officer Dowland that he worked for the Utah 
Highway Patrol. (R. 325:113). Fieeiki stated to officer Dowland that he and his wife "had 
an argument, and the argument became a little bit heated... and he got upset and pusher her 
out of the way." (R, 325: 113). Neither officer observed nor were they advised of any 
injuries on Fieeiki. (R, 325: 94,104,113). 
After speaking with Fusina, officer Dietrich spoke with Fieeiki and asked him what 
had occurred that evening. (R. 325:95). Fieeiki also completed a written witness statement 
regarding the events of the evening. (R. 325: 96-99). Officer Dietrich was advised that 
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Fusina had wanted to talk to Fieeiki about being depressed and about an earlier incident with 
her sister. (R. 325: 95). Fieeiki advised officer Dietrich he had a discussion with his wife, 
took a shower, and went to bed, however, Fusina wanted to continue the discussion and 
awoke Fieeiki to do so. (R. 325: 96). Fieeiki's witness statement indicated their earlier 
mentioned discussion had actually escalated into an argument. (R. 325: 99). Further 
investigation revealed that Fieeiki stated the argument escalated to a physical encounter with 
Fieeiki pushing and restraining, but not hitting, Fusina to get her away from him. (R. 325: 
100). Additionally, Fieeiki told officers that Fusina's injuries were self-inflicted. (R. 325: 
100). Officer Dietrich made the determination that Fieeiki committed an assault, domestic 
violence and was arrested. (R. 325: 100-101). 
Fusina was seen by Dr. Seduck Kim at an Instacare and she was treated for injuries on 
her face, neck, head, chest and lower back. (R. 325: 117-118). Dr. Kim documented a 
variety of bruises in these described areas. (R. 325: 121). 
West Valley City investigator Kevin Nudd ("Nudd") was assigned to follow up with 
both Fusina and Fieeiki. Two days after the assault, Nudd met with Fusina to photograph her 
injuries. (R. 325: 125). Nudd observed Fusina's bruised right cheek, bruised, swollen and 
scratched left temple area, and a scratch on her left neck. (R. 325: 125). 
Nudd also was assigned to conduct an interview with Fieeiki which occurred on 
September 9, 2003. (R. 325 126-127). During the interview Fieeiki was represented by 
attorney Ed Brass and also present at the interview was deputy prosecutor Sean Torriente. 
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(R. 325: 127). The interview was recorded and the jury heard a portion of the interview and 
read along with a transcript, Exhibit 6. (R. 325: 132; Exhibit 6). Exhibit 6 is located in the 
back of the trial transcript (R. 325) and is also reproduced as an addendum to the appellant's 
brief. 
At the time of the interview, Fieeiki was a suspect in a domestic violence assault, and 
as of the date of the interview, criminal charges had not been filed. (R. 1-4). At the 
beginning of the interview, Nudd notes that Fieeiki is there to give a statement regarding the 
incident and advises Fieeiki that the interview is being recorded, to which he affirms he 
understands. (Exhibit 6, page 1). Fieeiki was also advised that he will not be given his 
Miranda warning and affirmatively responds that he is there giving a statement willingly and 
"of his own" and that he knows he may consult with Mr. Brass at any time. (Exhibit 6, pages 
1-2). Nudd testified that prior to the hearing, he and Brass discussed the need to review 
Miranda, and Nudd was told by Brass that it didn't appear that there was any need for 
Miranda. (R. 328:20-23,56). Nudd requested that Fieeiki give him his side of the story and 
review the incident that took place the evening of August 4. (R. 328:21 -23; Exhibit 6, pages 
1-2). Fieeiki gave a much more detailed account of the night he was arrested than the 
account previously given to the officer Dietrich. (Exhibit 6, pages 3-31). During the 
interview, Fieeiki stated he was awakened by an unknown sharp pain in his left leg being 
administered by his wife. (Exhibit 6, page 7). Fieeiki continued, saying, that the room was 
dark but he saw his wife lunging over him, and his immediate response was to protect 
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himself. (Exhibit 6, page 7). Fieeiki admitted to slapping his wife with an open hand across 
the face, possibly twice. (R. 325: 175; Exhibit 6, pages 7-8). Fieeiki also admitted that in an 
attempt to get his wife's hands out he "round house" punched her three or four times on the 
back, causing her to urinate. (R. 325:133,175-176; Exhibit 6, page 8). Fieeiki stated he lost 
control of his anger and he was wrong and he is not proud of what he did. (Exhibit 6, pages 
17, 29). Fieeiki stopped hitting Fusina when he felt wetness from her urinating. (R. 325: 
192; Exhibit 6, page 20). When Fieeiki found out police had been called, he advised his wife 
to get in the shower to clean up and he would launder the soiled bedding. (Exhibit 6, page 
21). Fieeiki stated he thought he might be arrested for domestic violence, and he explained 
to Nudd there were a lot of things he did not tell the officers for fear of incriminating himself. 
(Exhibit 6, pages 12-13). 
On November 18, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
exclude defendant Fieeiki's statements made during the September 9, 2003 interview with 
Detective Kevin Nudd of the West Valley City Prosecutor's office. (R. 328). Apart from a 
few follow up questions by Torriente, Nudd conducted the entire interview of Fieeiki. (R. 
328). At the hearing, the parties stipulated that there was no negotiation between Mr. Brass 
and Mr. Torriente. (R. 328: 52). Nudd also testified that he did not engage in, nor was he a 
part of any plea discussions with Mr. Brass on or before the September 9th interview. (R. 
328: 57). 
Judge Christiansen also heard testimony from Mr. Brass and Mr. Huber, the Chief 
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Prosecutor at West Valley City regarding their recollections of the discussions prior to the 
September 9th interview. (R. 328: 5-51). Mr. Brass testified that the purpose of the meeting 
was for Mr. Fieeiki to be able to present his side of the story in hopes that charges would not 
be filed. (R. 328: 6). Mr. Brass, both by affidavit (R. 97) and by testimony stated he was in 
settlement negotiations with Mr. Huber seeking a resolution to the case. (R. 328: 7-8). 
However, Mr. Brass conceded that it was not impossible that a plea in abeyance was not 
offered prior to the September 9th interview and that the interview may have been conducted 
in an effort to assist the prosecution in making an appropriate charging decision or not 
making one at all. (R. 328: 15-16). Mr. Brass also testified it was his clients desire to come 
and make a statement. (R. 328: 14; R. 97). 
Mr. Huber testified that he was in charge of the case, both for screening and making 
the charging decision. (R. 328:28). Before the Information had been completed, Mr. Huber 
indicated he was contacted by Mr. Brass to discuss the case. (R. 328: 28). Mr. Huber 
recollected that Mr. Brass indicated that his client wanted an opportunity to come in and give 
his story to honor his profession by being upfront with the investigation and give a full story 
and because Fieeiki had provided little information at the time of the incident. (R. 328: 30, 
37-40). Mr. Huber testified that there was no negotiation going on at that time; in fact, Mr. 
Brass inquired whether a plea in abeyance could resolve the matter, to which Mr. Huber 
stated "that's not even in the cards. We are not even to a point we can talk like that." (R. 
328: 30). Mr. Huber also recalled Mr. Brass indicating that he just wanted Mr. Huber to 
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"hear my guy." (R. 328: 31). Mr. Huber arranged the meeting with Detective Nudd and 
Torriente, neither of which had any authority from Huber to engage in plea negotiations. (R. 
328:32). The Court received further testimony that Mr. Huber believed he had, even without 
a cooperative victim, enough evidence to proceed with a prosecution, and the admissions 
made in the course of the September 9 interview only strengthened the case. (R. 328: 33). 
When questioned about a plea offer, Mr. Huber indicated he advised Mr. Brass that Fieeiki 
could plead guilty to the domestic violence assault charge. (R. 328: 37). 
The defendant, Fieeiki, also testified at the hearing. Fieeiki stated that it was Mr. 
Brass' idea to speak with the prosecutors and that he was reluctant to have this meeting. (R. 
328: 65-67). Fieeiki stated Mr. Brass reassured him that everything would be ok, and that he 
(Mr. Brass) would take care of everything. (R. 328: 68). Fieeiki testified his expectation at 
the meeting was to tell the prosecutors what happened. (R. 328: 68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Rules of Evidence 408 and specifically 410 provide that evidence of any 
statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecution is not 
admissible. After a motion hearing on the matter, Judge Christiansen ruled that the 
statement Fieeiki gave during the interview with Nudd and Mr. Torriente was not in the 
course of a plea negotiation and was thus admissible. In denying Fieeiki's motion exclude 
the evidence, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances, including such facts as 
there were no indicia of a plea negotiations occurring, that Fieeiki was there voluntarily and 
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of his own free will, and was represented by his attorney, and that he appeared to be wanting 
to explain his side of the story. 
This Court should adopt the totality of the circumstances test and conclude that the 
trial court's finding that the interview between Nudd and Fieeiki was a continuation of the 
investigation and not a plea negotiation is not clearly erroneous and is amply supported by 
the record. If this Court were to decide that the interview did constitute a plea negotiation, it 
can remain confident in the jury verdict because admission of the incriminating statements 
constituted harmless error. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN CORRECTLY RULED THAT FIEEIKFS 
STATEMENTS MADE TO NUDD AND TORRIENTE WERE PART OF 
AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION. 
The real issue in this case is whether or not the statements made by Fieeiki were part 
of an ongoing investigation or whether they were made as a part of a plea negotiation. The 
answer to that question will determine the admissibility of the statements under Rule 410, 
Utah Rules of Evidence1 Fieeiki goes to great lengths to discuss the legal mandate of Rule 
1
 Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in part, except as otherwise provided in this 
rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against 
the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later 
withdrawn. 
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410 and the City agrees with his conclusion: if a statement is obtained through the course of 
a plea bargain, than it is inadmissible. However, the opposite is also true, if there is no plea 
or compromise negotiation, or settlement offers, Rules 408 and 410 are inapplicable and the 
evidence is admissible. 
In Santobello v New York, the Supreme Court recognized the essential benefit to the 
criminal justice system of the plea bargain, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), and how plea 
bargaining "can benefit all concerned." Blackledge v Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
Some of the benefits include: the defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and 
the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the 
chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential 
there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce 
resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal 
offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. 
Id. 
But, "all of these considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an 
accused and a prosecutor." Santobello, at 261. "Rule 11 is designed to ensure the fairness of 
the plea bargaining process and to encourage frank plea discussions between the parties." 
2
 Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, formerly Rule 11(e)(6), titled 
Admissibility or Inadmissibility of a Plea, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements states 
the admissibility or inadmissibility of a plea, a plea discussion, and any related statement is 
governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 410. Federal Rule of Evidence 410 is identical to 
Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and in State v. Pearson this Court stated that we 
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United States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 817 (1st Cir.1990). However, "discussions means plea 
discussions, and not simply anything that might ultimately lead to such." Id. Not all 
statements made in hopes of some concessions are necessarily plea discussions. People v. 
Victory, 419 N.E.2d 73, 76 (III.App.Ct.1981). 
What is a plea discussion under Rule 410? The 1980 amendments to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 410 which attempted to make the rules more precise and easier to apply, have 
divided the courts. This division is over the threshold issue of what standard should be 
applied to determine whether a statement has been made "in the course of plea discussions." 
Many courts have adopted a two-tiered test articulated in United States v. Robertson, 582 
F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.l978)(en banc)3 The Robertson court, interpreting pre-1980 
version of the rules, held, a court must determine "first, whether the accused exhibited an 
actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, 
whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. at 1366 (citations omitted). Other courts, however, have found that the Robertson test has 
been superseded by the 1980 amendments to the rules and have instead adopted a totality of 
may look to federal cases for interpretation when the rules are identical. 818 P.2d 581, 583 
(Utah App. 1991). 
3
 See also, United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1367-8 (9th Cir. 1988)(adopting 
Robertson test); United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1240-41 (7th Cir.l980)(same); 
United States v. Fronk, 173 F.R.D. 59, 67 (W.D.N.Y.1997)(same). 
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the circumstances test. The characterization of a statement as plea related will turn on the 
facts of each case. Victory at 76. 
In determining whether a discussion should be characterized as a plea negotiation and 
thus inadmissible, this Court should apply the totality of the circumstances test. This will 
allow the Court to review all the facts of the record, including the two-tiered analysis 
delineated in Robertson. In this case, it is clear from the record, that the District Court 
applied a totality of the circumstance test to the facts. In Judge Christiansen's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions To Defendant's Motion to Exclude Statements Given During 
Investigative Interview (R. 155), paragraph eight states, "[i]n making a decision as to 
whether or not this interview was for the purpose of a plea negotiation or for further 
investigation, the court has to look primarily to the recording of the interview itself. In 
looking at the record, the court finds a number of factors persuasive." (R. 157, f 8). And, the 
facts, taken as a whole, indicate the statements offered by the defendant were obtained during 
an investigative interview, not "compromise negotiations" or "plea discussions." 
"Before a statement may be characterized as plea related, "it must contain the 
rudiments of the negotiation process, i.e., a willingness by defendant to enter a plea of guilty 
in return for concessions by the State." People v. Taylor, 682 N.E.2d 310, 313-14 
(111. App.Ct. 1997). The court found that after reading the transcripts of the interview, there 
4
 See, United States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir.l990)(the "plain language" of the 
rule should be applied); United States v. Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183,1186 (8th Cir. 1994)(applying a 
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were no terms in that transcripts that would indicate a plea agreement was taking place or 
that a plea agreement was anticipated. (R. 157, ]f9). Additionally, the court found that if the 
interview were indeed a plea agreement, certain terms would be expected, such as, "reduced 
charge," "negotiated settlement," "plea agreement," "deal," or "plea in abeyance" which 
were devoid from the transcript. (R. 157, f 10). Furthermore, the Court found that there was 
no indication on the record that a plea negotiation was taking place, and there was no hint the 
conversation was protected or privileged. (R. 158, ^ [11). The appellant notes the difficulty in 
"marshaling the evidence in support of a "negative finding"... because it requires one to 
amass evidence to prove the absence of something." (Appellant's Brief, 13). A more logical 
assessment of the reason the record was absent references to plea bargaining, is simply 
because it wasn't a plea bargain. 
At the end of the transcript there is an exchange between Mr. Brass and Nudd 
wrapping up the interview which is alleged to be confirmation of a plea negotiation: 
NUDD: WELL THOSE ARE ALL THINGS THAT I'M SURE THAT YOU'LL BE 
BRINGING UP. AND YOU CAN TALK TO MR. HUBER ABOUT. 
BRASS: I FIGURED YOU GUYS WOULD DO THAT SO...DO YOU KNOW WHAT 
THE TIME FRAME THAT YOU GUYS ARE WORKING WITH? 
NUDD: HOPEFULLY I'LL HAVE A DECISION ON THIS RATHER QUICK NOW 
THAT WE'VE GOT A STATEMENT. 
BRASS: OKAY. ALRIGHT THEN, THANKS. (R. 328, 9). 
However, at the time of this interview, the defendant had not been charged with any 
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criminal offense. Nudd is supplying information to Brass and the defendant, not about a plea 
negotiation, but rather the charging decision. Since the defendant was merely a suspect in an 
ongoing investigation, there was nothing for which the parties could compromise or 
negotiate. Arguably, a criminal case cannot be plea bargained or negotiated unless it has 
been filed. "[P]lea negotiations contemplate a bargaining process, a 'mutuality of 
advantage,'... and a mutuality of disadvantage. That is, the government and the accused both 
seek a concession for a concession, a quid pro quo... The accused contemplates entering a 
plea to obtain a concession from the government. The government contemplates making 
some concession to obtain the accuseds plea." Robertson, at 1365-66. The transcript shows 
no indication of a quid pro quo. 
The trial court reached the conclusion that Fieeiki had come for the interview so he 
could have an opportunity to tell his side of the story. Mr. Huber testified that he believed 
the defendant, honoring his profession, was giving a statement to "come clean." In 
Robertson, the court stated "...the court must distinguish between "those discussions in 
which the accused was merely making an admission and those discussions in which the 
accused was seeking to negotiate a plea agreement." Id. at 1367. Even the defendant's own 
attorney stated the purpose of the meeting, "as I (Brass) understood it", was for Fieeiki to be 
able to present his side of the story. There is conflicting testimony, however, from the 
defendant, who stated it was not his desire to have an interview with Nudd, but Mr. Brass 
encouraged him to make the statement to the prosecutors. (R. 328: 69-70). "Not all 
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statements made in hopes of some concession are necessarily plea discussions." People v. 
Jones, 734 N.E.2d 207, 213 (Ill.App.3.d2000). 
The trial court while balancing all the facts had to make a credibility decision. While 
reminding the attorney's that he respects them, he also has to deal with their conflicting 
testimony regarding whether a plea in abeyance was offered, as Mr. Brass and the defendant 
have stated or whether it was being sought out by the defendant, as Mr. Huber recollected. 
The record doesn't detail a clear "winner" as to whether or not Mr. Brass' recollection was 
more correct than Mr. Huber's or vice versa. What is noted on the record, however, is that 
the trial court believed some of the maneuverings may have been done for strategic reasons, 
which sometimes works and sometimes do not. (R. 328: 98). The trial court also found that 
the defendant supplied his statement while desiring to obtain leniency from the prosecutors. 
Both Mr. Brass testified that he would like to get the case dismissed as did Fieeiki, who 
stated he was hoping for a dismissal. (R. 328: 6,68). 
Rule 410 clearly states that if a "plea discussion" is conducted with an attorney for the 
prosecution, not resulting in a guilty plea or later withdrawn guilty plea, the "plea discussion" 
is inadmissible. During the interview of Fieeiki, West Valley City did have an attorney 
present. But that, in and of itself, will not automatically make the interview a plea 
negotiation. First, Mr. Torriente had little to do with the questioning of Fieeiki. A reading of 
the transcript confirms that Nudd was conducting the interview. (Exhibit 6). 
In U.S v. Penta, the defendant (not yet indicted) made statements to a United States Attorney, 
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and an investigator with whom the defendant was trying to get an agreement not to prosecute. 
The conversation is described as: 
The attorney told the defendant it would be in his best interests to tell candidly and 
completely. Defendant asked if he cooperated, and gave documentation, "What is 
going to happen to me?" "My [the attorney] response was along the lines I'm not 
going to promise you anything. I can't tell you how we're going to resolve this thing. 
The ball is in your court one hundred percent.... In what we would agree to the idea 
was, again, that this would be resolved through plea agreement; that his cooperation 
would be taken into account, and that what we would recommend would be lessened." 
898 F.2d at 817. This court held this was not a plea discussion within the rule.5 This court 
also disagreed with the holding in U.S. v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.1986) that a 
"preliminary discussion must be considered as part of the overall plea bargaining process." 
While Nudd was assigned by Huber to conduct this follow up investigation, he was 
not given any authority to enter into any bargain with Brass or the defendant and lacked any 
power to negotiate. Similarly, Mr. Torriente was also not given authority by Mr. Huber to 
negotiate any plea or any other compromise at the interview. In fact, it was described as a 
training for Mr. Torriente, being as he was a new attorney at the time. (R. 328: 32-33). The 
transcript of the interview shows that neither Nudd nor Torriente engaged in even an attempt 
at a compromise or negotiation with Brass or the defendant. 
If the Robertson two tiered analysis were applied to this case, the defendant cannot 
succeed. First, Fieeiki does not have a subjective belief he was engaged in plea negotiations. 
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There is no indication on the record that Fieeiki, other than self serving testimony at the 
hearing, manifested a subjective belief to anyone. Fieeiki did not exhibit an expectation to 
negotiate at the time of the interview. Second, even if Fieeiki had exhibited a subjective 
belief that he was negotiating a plea during the September 9 meeting, this belief is 
objectively unreasonable. "In assessing the reasonableness of suspects belief that he was 
engaged in plea negotiations when he made incriminating statements, the court considers 
such factors as whether the suspect was in custody or charged with any crime, and whether 
there was any discussion of pleas or charges." U.S. v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1368. 
ISSUE II. ADMISSION OF FIEEIKPS STATEMENT CONSTITUTED 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
If this Court finds that Fieeki's incriminating statements met the criteria of a plea 
negotiation or compromise and deems them inadmissible statements, the Court can still be 
confident in the jury's verdict and should not require a new trial. Rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, states that any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that we should not upset the verdict of a jury 
merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do so only if it is 
something substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there would have been a different result. State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 
5
 Referencing Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e), as previously noted states to see Fed.R.Evidence 410, 
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(Utah 1980). 
During the course of the investigation, several officers observed the injuries to Fusina, 
which were documented by photographs. (R. 325: 93, 126). Fusina did not testify at the 
trial, however, officers and a doctor testified as to what they observed the night of the 
incident. West Valley City believes that even if an error had been committed, the evidence of 
the defendant's guilt is overwhelming and can be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
any such error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the record amply shows the trial court could find the interview was not a plea 
negotiation, but rather an investigatory interview and this Court should affirm the decision of 
the trial court. This Court should adopt the totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether a discussion or interview is a plea negotiation. The defendant's participation in the 
interview was nothing more than a defense strategy or tactic which, in hindsight, the 
defendant wishes he could undo. Fieeiki should not be afforded a new trial because in the 
absence of his incriminating statement there would have been no different result. 
which reads identically to Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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